China is the world leader in deep-sea exploration, and the distance between Beijing and Washington is widening.
The sight of a white research ship zigzagging across the Northwest Pacific, ostensibly cataloguing potato-shaped rocks on the ocean floor, while its location beacon periodically blinks off the map, is subtly unsettling. Since 2016, that ship, the Xiang Yang Hong 01, which translates to “Facing the Red Sun” with almost poetic bluntness, has been doing just that. Furthermore, it might not be the only one doing more than it seems.
Eight Chinese state-owned ships officially designated for deep-sea mining research were tracked in a joint Mongabay and CNN investigation. The data showed that these vessels actually worked in the exploration zones that the International Seabed Authority had designated for them for surprisingly little time. Rather, they spent a lot of time in waters with a different kind of strategic significance, such as shipping lanes and submarine transit zones, where any military planner would find it crucial to understand what moves beneath the surface.
None of this is evidence of surveillance or espionage. China has not made any admissions and is unlikely to do so. However, it is difficult to ignore the pattern: ships with known connections to the Chinese Navy, port calls at military-affiliated establishments, and occasionally going dark in sensitive waters. These vessels might just be multitasking in the same way that financially strapped research programs occasionally do. Another possibility is that the mining research was always at least partially a convenient cover story.
Long before Washington acknowledged the deep sea as a competitive area, China started making a significant push into this area. Deep-sea exploration was officially designated as a national priority in Beijing’s 14th five-year plan, which ran from 2021 to 2025. China was already setting up infrastructure, negotiating ISA exploration licenses, and constructing what officials now refer to as a permanent deep-sea hub—roughly 2,000 meters below the surface—while American lawmakers were still debating the environmental risks of seabed mining in congressional hearings. That facility, which is presently being built, would represent a capability that the United States just lacks.
The metals found inside those nodules on the Pacific floor—cobalt, manganese, nickel, and copper—are the same elements required for semiconductors, electric cars, and the batteries that power the upcoming generation of military equipment. China has an almost visceral understanding of this connection. Beijing has been protecting land-based rare earth supply chains for years. It makes sense to go a few kilometers deeper rather than deviate from that approach.
Observing all of this, it seems like Washington is always running one meeting behind schedule. Both powers are now openly vying for seabed access in the Cook Islands’ waters, making it a flashpoint. Although acceleration suggests you were already moving, the United States is stepping up its own push. America wasn’t for the majority of the previous ten years.
There are many serious critics of the entire endeavor who contend that the ocean itself is the true loser in this case, not China or America. They caution that before anyone fully comprehends what lives down there, deep-sea ecosystems may suffer irreversible harm. They worry that the geopolitical rivalry will simply push both countries to extract before they fully consider the ramifications. It’s unlikely that this tension will end amicably. Environmental review often becomes a formality when two major powers are competing.
It is evident that the seafloor is now disputed territory, with China being the first to claim it.
